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COMMENT
R UMMEL v. ESTELLE:
LEAVING THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENTS CLAUSE IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMBO
INTRODUCTION
The eighth amendment guarantees an individual convicted of
crime the right to be free from the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishments.' The eighth amendment language is terse; as a result,
the Supreme Court has yet to arrive at a concrete standard ap-
plicable to all eighth amendment challenges. Historically, the Court
applied the cruel and unusual punishments (CUP) clause to the
method of punishment and was reluctant to hold that punishments
may be cruel and unusual for being disproportionately excessive in
relation to the offense, or offenses, committed. An important shift in
eighth amendment interpretation took place in Coker v. Georgia,' in
which the Court explicitly found the death penalty an unconstitu-
tionally disproporationate punishment for rape. Notwithstanding the
fact that the Court accepted that proportionality is a constitutional
minimum for the criminal law, the Court-under the guise of judicial
deference to state legislative prerogative-has refused to apply,
with few exceptions, the proportionality concept of the CUP clause
to any punishment but the death penalty.
In Rummel v. Estelle,3 the Court encountered an eighth amend-
ment challenge in which the Court had the opportunity to apply the
concept of proportionality to length of imprisonment alone in the
context of the Texas recidivist statute which mandated life im-
prisonment for three-time felons. The Court held that a mandatory
life sentence imposed on a three-time nonviolent felon pursuant to
the Texas recidivist statute does not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment under the eighth and fourteenth amendments." The deci-
sion in Rummel was both consistent and inconsistent with earlier
Supreme Court decisions and rationale.
1. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
3. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
4. Id. at 285.
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The inconsistencies in the Rummel decision are found in the
refusal by the Court to extend the rationale the Court had
developed in the capital punishment cases,5 and in the rejection of
the standard established in the leading case of Weems v. United
States.' The Court in Rummel determined that neither the death
penalty cases nor Weems applied to constitutional challenges to the
length of prison terms because those cases involved punishments
uniquely different than the life imprisonment at issue in Rummel.
Mandatory life imprisonment is unique also; therefore the problems
the Court considered in Weems and the death penalty cases should
have applied to Rummel as well.
On the other hand, the decision in Rummel was consistent with
earlier decisions because the Court maintained its traditional policy
of judicial restraint. The Court declined to invalidate the sentence
because Texas had a right to punish the defendant severely for
being a habitual offender. Furthermore, a mandatory life sentence
for a habitual nonviolent thief is not necessarily unconstitutionally
disproportionate to the crimes committed, especially in light of the
Texas policies regarding parole and good-time credit (GTC). The
decision in Rummel was consistent with its earlier decisions because
the Court refused to draw lines traditionally drawn by state
legislatures.
FACTS
In 1973 William James Rummel was convicted for feloniously
obtaining $120.75 under false pretenses.7 He had served two
previous prison terms for felony convictions: a 1964 conviction for
presenting a credit card with the intent to defraud in order to
obtain approximately $80, and a 1969 conviction for passing a forged
check with a face value of $28.36.' The defendant received a life
sentence under the Texas recidivist statute (article 63) which man-
dated a trial court to sentence a three-time felon to life imprison-
ment.5 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction
and the punishment."° Without a hearing, the Texas courts denied
5. See notes 63-93 infra and accompanying text.
6. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). See notes 35-43, 103-17 infra and accompanying text.
7. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 266.
8. Id. at 265-66.
9. Id. at 266. Rummel was convicted and sentenced pursuant to TEX. PENAL
CODE art. 63 (Vernon 1925) which provided: "Whoever shall have been three times con-
victed of a felony less than capital shall on such third conviction be imprisoned for life
in the penitentiary." Id. at 264. Article 63 is now codified as TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
tit. 3 § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974).
10. Rummel v. Estelle, 509 S.W.2d 630, 634 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
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Rummel any post-conviction relief, and the federal district court,
also without a hearing, denied his petition for habeas corpus relief
from his mandatory state confinement." Rummel appealed the
district court decision on two grounds: first, that his sentence
violated the eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments for the reason that a mandatory life sentence was ex-
cessive and disproportionate to the severity of his crimes; and
second, that his court-appointed attorney rendered ineffectual
assistance of counsel in violation of his sixth amendment right. 2
Originally the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed
on the eighth amendment ground. 3 After a brief review of past in-
terpretation of the CUP clause, the divided panel court concluded
that a sentence of imprisonment for life may be disproportionate
under certain circumstances." Texas argued that the sentence im-
posed on the defendant should not be equated with actual life in-
carceration in light of Texas' systems for GTC and parole. The panel
court dismissed this argument, because if the proportionality (and
hence the constitutionality) of his sentence were to depend on the
availability of parole, then the court would have had to review the
state parole decisions and procedures, both of which, ordinarily,
were not reviewable in federal court." The panel court was unwill-
ing to review the state parole proceedings, but in order to review
the proportionality of Rummel's life sentence, the panel adopted the
systematic test employed in Hart v. Coiner.'6 Under the Hart test,
11. Rummel v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1193, 1195 (5th Cir. 1978) (panel decision)..
12. Id. at 1194. The panel did not consider the sixth amendment issue
originally and therefore the en banc court remanded this issue to the panel for treat-
ment. Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651, 662 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc). This comment con-
siders only the eighth amendment challenge.
13. Rummel v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1193, 1200 (5th Cir. 1978) (panel).
14. Id at 1196.
15. Id.
16. 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied 415 U.S. 938 (1974). In Hart, the
court held that a mandatory life sentence imposed upon the prisoner pursuant to West
Virginia's recidivist statute (which is similar to the Texas statute) was constitutionally
excessive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the underlying offenses. Since a
life sentence was not necessary to achieve any legitimate legislative purpose, the court
concluded that the life sentence amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 143.
The crimes in Hart were drawing a $50 check on insufficient funds, transporting forged
checks with a face value of $140 across state lines, and perjury (facts not dissilimar to
the situation in Rummel).
In Hart, the court considered cumulatively: the nature of the crimes commit-
ted, the legislative purpose behind the punishment, the punishment that the defendant
would have received in other jurisdictions, and the punishment imposed for other of-
fenses in the same jurisdiction. Although these four factors were applied cumulatively,
1980]
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the panel court found the defendant's life sentence unconstitutional-
ly disproportionate. 7 The panel court recognized the broad
prerogative of the state legislature to fix sentence ranges for pro-
scribed criminal conduct, but the court added that this prerogative
has some bounds defined by rational penological objectives, the
bounds to be ascertained by the judiciary. 8 The panel court held
that a court may intervene if the punishment determined by the
state legislature exceeds the bounds of rational objectives. However,
this view, that the judiciary may place limits on state legislative
prerogative, did not prevail when Rummel was reheard by the
Court of Appeals sitting en banc.
The en bane court determined that it should adhere to the
policy of judicial restraint. In deference to the Texas legislature, the
court held that it would not invalidate article 63 unless it was clear-
ly irrational even if the law and the Texas penal system did not con-
form to modern penological trends. 9 The court determined that it
must uphold the defendant's mandatory life sentence because there
existed a rational basis behind the sentence, especially in light of
parole and GTC possibilities.'
The court found several rational bases for upholding Rummel's
sentence. It found that the article 63 mandate for life imprisonment
would not be set in motion unless the state proved that a prisoner
had been convicted of three felonies. It was also essential that a
prisoner had actually spent time in prison for each prior conviction.2
The en banc court determined that these inherent requirements of
article 63 protected a prisoner adequately.
In addition to the fact that the recidivist statute would rarely
be invoked due to these stringent prerequisites, the en bane court
determined that a review of the proportionality of sentence terms
required the reviewing court to consider parole and GTC
possibilities. The court found that it would be unrealistic to assess
the Texas penal system without GTC and that Texas does not im-
pose life sentences without the possibility of parole.' The court took
the court in Hart analyzed the case also in terms of the factors in combination. While
the Supreme Court had considered these factors in earlier cases, the first enunciation
of this test occurred in Hart.
17. Rummel v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1193, 1200 (5th Cir. 1978) (panel).
18. Id.
19. Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651, 661-62 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane).
20. Id at 655-56.
21. Id. at 656-57.
22. Id at 657.
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the GTC and parole possibilities into consideration and concluded
that it was likely that the defendant could become eligible for parole
in twelve years or less." Thus, the court upheld his mandatory life
sentence because the sentence would be significantly less in practice
as a result of parole and GTC.
The court further analyzed the sentence under the Hart tests.
The court assessed the nature of the offenses committed and deter-
mined that the defendant was punished for his status as a habitual
felon, not simply for stealing $230.00. Since he was punished for
being a habitual felon and not for a single crime, the en banc court
stated that his sentence could not be compared appropriately to a
penalty for any single offense in Texas. The court held that to
punish the defendant with a twelve-year sentence was constitutional
and that the burden ought to be on him to prove that he is worthy
of freedom.24 Since the court rejected the notion that the defendant
had been sentenced for his natural life, but more likely for only
about twelve years, the court determined that the comparison with
other states' practices should be made according to this more
realistic standard. Accordingly, the court found that he might have
received comparable sentences in several other jurisdictions.25 Final-
ly, the court expressly rejected the second Hart factor regarding
legislative purpose because the test was impractical outside the con-
text of the capital punishment cases. Under three of the four Hart
standards, the court found the defendant was punished for his
status as a habitual felon, and, as such, he might have received com-
parable punishment in other jurisdictions.
The en banc court held that Rummel's mandatory life sentence
was not unconstitutionally disproportionate for three reasons. The
sentence was, in practice if not in theory, one for a term of about
twelve years. None of the Hart tests compelled a different result.
Finally, the en banc court upheld the sentence because the court
found several rational reasons for doing so. The Supreme Court af-
firmed the holding and rationale of the en banc court. Any analysis
of the Supreme Court decision, however, must start with a review of
the development of the proportionality concept because it can be
argued that the Supreme Court rejected some of its previously held
views.
23. Id. at 659.
24. Id. at 659-60.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 661. See Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment II: The
Eighth Amendment After Furman v. Georgia, 25 STAN. L. REV. 62, 77-78 (1972).
1980]
et al.: Rummel v. Estelle: Leaving the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clau
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1980
206 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.15
DISPROPORTIONALITY IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
In the past, courts applied a historical test to determine the
nature and scope of the CUP clause.27 The basic interpretive pro-
blem with the CUP clause has been whether it referred only to the
method of punishment, or whether it also authorized judicially en-
forceable limits to the severity of the punishment with respect to
the severity of the crime.28 The term proportionality refers to this
relationship between the severity of the punishment and the severity
of the crime. While it always has been clear that one purpose of the ban
was to avoid the atrocities of Stuart England, American courts, and
especially the Supreme Court, have been slow to read the concept of
proportionality in the CUP clause. Recent research suggests that
the framers of the Bill of Rights intended disproportionality to be a
part of the ban not only because the Stuarts' barbarities were used
rarely in colonial America,29 but also because the European
philosophers who influenced eighteenth century American political
thought embraced the proportionality concept.' Nonetheless, courts
ignored the proportionality concept throughout the nineteenth cen-
tury, during which time they applied the CUP clause generally to
punishments that inflicted torture or acute pain and suffering." The
early Supreme Court interpretation of the CUP clause was that the
prohibition applied to the method of punishment, not to its amount
or its proportion to the nature of the crime committed.
The first recognition of the proportionality principle occurred
in a dissenting opinion in O'Neil v. Vermont.3" The majority failed to
27. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted" The Original
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 840 (1969). Granucci and other authorities have con-
cluded that the prohibition derived from the English Bill of Rights of 1689, and may
reach as far back as the Magna Carta. See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 288-89
(Powell, J., dissenting); 34 MINN. L. REv. 134, 135 (1950).
28. D. FELLMEN, THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TODAY 384 (1976).
29. Granucci, supra note 27, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 842 (1969).
30. Comment, The Eighth Amendment Beccaria, and The Enlightenment An
Historical Justification for the Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment Doc-
trine, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 783 (1975).
31. Granucci, supra note 27, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 842 (1969); See also Note,
The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79
HARV. L. REV. 635, 636-37 (1966). The nineteenth century Supreme Court cases involv-
ing the CUP clause dealt exclusively with the method of punishment. In Re Kemmler,
136 U.S. 436 (1890) (death by electrocution not unconstitutional); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99
U.S. 130 (1878) (death by shooting for first-degree murder not unconstitutional);
Pervear v. Commonwealth, 72 U.S. 475 (1867) ($50 fine and three months at hard labor
not unconstitutional).
32. 144 U.S. 323, 337 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting).
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reach the issue of disproportionate punishment. It upheld a $6,600
fine, or upon default, a fifty-four year prison term for the conviction
on 307 separate counts of illegal liquor sales. Justice Field likened
the penalty to the state punishing a person indefinitely for drinking
a glass of liquor under a prohibition against drinking a drop.'
Justice Field stated that, while the clause was usually applied to
torturous punishments,
[tihe inhibition is directed, not only against punishments
of the character mentioned, but against all punishments
which by their excessive length or severity are greatly
disproportioned to the offences [sic] charged. The whole
inhibition is against that which is excessive either in the
bail required, or fine imposed, or punishment inflicted. 4
Thus, it was not until the late nineteenth century that the propor-
tionality principle was described by the Supreme Court.
Seventeen years later the Court faced another claim of
disproportionate penalties in Weems v. United States.35 Weems, a
minor government official in the Philippines, was convicted of falsify-
ing an official cash book in order to conceal the illegal disposition of
a small amount of money. Although there was no proof of intent to
defraud nor evidence of any loss to the government," Weems was
fined and sentenced to fifteen years of cadena temporal Cadena
temporal was an exotic punishment consisting of imprisonment for a
term of years during which time the prisoner worked at hard labor
while shackled in chains. In addition, the punishment included
33. Id. at 339. This comparison highlights the fine line betwen the identity of
the offense and the proportionality concept of the CUP clause. These concepts are
separate and distinct and should not be confused. The issue in cases like O'Neil is not
whether the punishment is proportionate to a single offense, but, rather, how a court
can rationally break down a series of separate counts which, together, constitute a
single crime or episode. In O'Nei the defendant illegally transported liquor over state
lines 307 times. These illegal sales were part of a continuing enterprise that should
have been prosecuted as a single crime. As a single crime, the scheme should not have
been punished by multiplying the penalty for one illegal sale by 307. Id at 328, 365. In
other words, at some point a court must clarify exactly what is the unit of the offense.
On the other hand, Rumnel was clearly a proportionality case. The three
crimes Defendant committed were separate and unrelated crimes, as opposed to the
307 counts that constituted one crime in ONeil This fine distinction makes Rummel a
case of disproportionality governed by the CUP clause.
34. Id at 339-40 (emphasis added).
35. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
36. Granucci, supra note 27, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 843 (1969).
1980]
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various post-imprisonment restrictions.7 The Court noted the ex-
cessiveness of the punishment and stated
[s]uch penalties for such offenses amaze those who have
formed their conception of the relation of a state to even
its offending citizens from the practice of the American
commonwealths, and believe that it is a precept of justice
that punishment for crime should be graduated and pro-
portioned to offense."
The Court determined that, while the CUP clause historically had
been applied to certain modes of punishment, the Court must con-
strue the clause progressively in order to take "new conditions and
purposes" into consideration. 9 Since the sentence under considera-
tion had "no fellow in American legislation," and its origin was dif-
ferent from that of sentences derived from American jurisdictions,
the Court held that it was "cruel in its excess of imprisonment and
that which accompanies and follows imprisonment. It is unusual in
its character. Its punishments come under condemnation of the Bill
of Rights, both on account of their degree and kind.""0 Weems
represented the first case in which the Court relied on the propor-
tionality principle of the CUP clause to invalidate a punishment.
The Court, however, inferred that it would invoke the CUP
clause only in unusual cases. The Court conceded the broad
legislative prerogative to define crimes and their punishment, but
indicated that when that prerogative encounters a constitutional
prohibition a legal duty to intervene arises."1 After comparing
Weems' sentence with those authorized in a number of American
jurisdictions for crimes it considered equally serious, the Court held
that, even if the minimum amount of cadena temporal had been im-
posed, such a punishment would have been repugnant to the Bill of
Rights." As a result of this decision, both state and federal courts
37. The post-imprisonment penalties included: (1) civil interdiction, consisting
of deprivation of the rights of parental and marital authority, guardianship of person
or property and the right to dispose of property inter vivos; and (2) perpetual absolute
disqualification from holding office, voting, acquiring honors and loss of retirement
pay; and (3) surveillance for life. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 364 (1910).
38. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366-67 (1910) (emphasis added).
39. Id at 373, 378. The Court indicated that the CUP clause of the Phillipine
Bill of Rights derived from the United States Constitution and therefore must have
the same meaning.
40. Id at 377.
41. Id. at 378-79.
42. Id. at 382.
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alike have accepted the concept that the excessiveness as well as
method of punishment may be unconstitutionally cruel. 3
Even though the Court acknowledged the proportionality con-
cept of the CUP clause and applied the concept in Weems, the Court
has rarely invoked the CUP clause to invalidate harsh sentences."
In addition to the Court's traditional deference to legislative judg-
ment, this reluctance has been attributed to the fact that the com-
parative law technique employed by the Court in Weems was
limited substantially in Badders v. United States.'5 Without a clearly
defined' guide to eighth amendment application, appellate courts
chose restraint; they invalidated punishments based on a measure of
decency only when they were so disproportionate to the offense as
to be morally shocking.'"
The Court found a morally shocking result in Robinson v.
California.'7 This case involved a California statute that made it a
criminal offense for a person to be a narcotics addict. The Court
found this statute repugnant to the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments because the statute classified the status of narcotics addiction
as a criminal offense. 8 The Court maintained that questions of im-
prisonment cannot be considered in the abstract for "[e]ven one day
in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of
having a common cold." ' The Robinson decision limited the states'
power to define crime.' Robinson was not a case in which the Court
found the particular punishment cruel and unusual in its method or
43. See Note, supra note 31, 79 HARV. L. REV. at 640.
44. The cases in which the Court has invoked the CUP clause to invalidate
sentences are: Godfrey v. Georgia, __ U.S. ., 100 S.Ct. 1759 (1980); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
45. 240 U.S. 391 (1916); Note, supra note 31, 79 HARV L. REV at 640. In Bad-
ders, Mr. Justice Holmes, a dissenter in Weems, cited Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S.
126, 136 (1903) (10 years imprisonment for conspiracy not unconstitutional) for the pro-
position that "[u]ndue leniency in one case does not transform a reasonable punishment
in another case to a cruel one." See notes 125-27 infra and accompanying text.
46. See Note, supra note 31, 79 HARV. L. REV. at 640-41.
47. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
48. Id. at 666. The decision in Robinson represented the first time that the
eighth amendment had been applied to the state via the fourteenth amendment. D.
FELLMAN, supra note 28 at 402.
49. Id at 667.
50. See Note, supra note 31, 79 HARV. L. REV. at 646.
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proportion to the offense of addiction. 1 This application of the CUP
clause to the nature of the criminal conduct instead of the method or
kind of punishment was a novel use of the clause. Nonetheless, the
Robinson decision failed to clarify the doctrinal uncertainty created
by the Court's ill-defined eighth amendment standard.2
This doctrinal uncertainty continued a year later when the
Court in Rudolph v. Alabama' declined the opportunity to decide
whether the death penalty would be unconstitutional on eighth
amendment grounds for rape. Mr. Justice Goldberg's dissenting
opinion was significant in several respects.' In addition to reassert-
ing the legitimacy of the comparative law approach used effectively
in Weems, Justice Goldberg queried whether the objective of
punishment could be achieved just as effectively by punishing rape
less severely than by death; and, if so, whether the death penalty
then is unnecessarily cruel in the context of rape cases.5 The
revitalization of the comparative law standard and the birth of the
"legislative ends" test anticipated the reasoning later to be applied
by the Court in finding that death was in fact a constitutionally in-
appropriate punishment for rape."
Notwithstanding the Rudolph dissent, the Court refused to ex-
tend its decision in Robinson to cover the status of a chronic
alcoholic in Powell v. Texas. 5' The Court held that Powell did not
fall within the ambit of Robinson because Powell was not convicted
for his status as an alcoholic, but for being drunk in public." Accord-
ing to the Court, Texas imposed the sentence for criminal behavior
which created substantial health and safety hazards, not for mere
status." The Court argued that to extend the Robinson doctrine to
situations like that in Powell would violate "[tiraditional common-
law concepts of personal accountability and essential considerations
of federalism."" The Court stated that to extend the Robinson doc-
51. See also Comment, supra note 30, at 802.
52. One commentator attributes this uncertainty to the lack of an acceptable
historical justification for the Court's action and posits this void as a reason for the
Court's reluctance to extend the excessive punishment doctrine of the CUP clause. Id.
53. 375 U.S. 889 (1963).
54. See generally Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L.
REv. 1071 (1964).
55. Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 891 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
56. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
57. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
58. Id. at 532.
59. Id.
60. I& at 535.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 1 [1980], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol15/iss1/6
RUMMEL v. ESTELLE
trine would be akin to creating an inflexible constitutional test
which would freeze the process of adjustment created by such state-
controlled criminal law doctrines as actus reus, mens rea, insanity,
mistake, justification and duress."' The four dissenting Justices
maintained that the fundamental teaching in Robinson demanded
acquittal in this case. Like Robinson, Powell should not be criminally
punished for "being in a condition he is powerless to change."6
While the disproportionality doctrine experienced some revitaliza-
tion during the Warren Court, the doctrine limped into the Burger
era.
In Furman v. Georgia,8 the Court faced an eighth amendment
challenge in the context of a murder and two rape convictions to be
punished by death. In a 5-4 per curiam opinion, the Court held that
the death penalty may in some cases constitute cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the eighth and 'fourteenth amendments.1
4
Furman is significant in that, while all five Justices in favor of the
decision 5 found the arbitrariness with which the sentence had been
imposed to be an important factor in striking down the death penal-
ty, only Justices Brennan and Marshall attempted to apply any
variation of the proportionality concept to the cases and they were
the only Justices who found the death penalty per se unconstitu-
tional." Drawing from the dissent in Rudolph,7 Justice Brennan
recognized four principles applicable to testing the constitutionality
of specific punishments and designed to curb the abuse of legislative
power.6 Justice Marshall concluded that the Court has invariably
61. Id at 535-36.
62. Id. at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting). It might be noted that there was a ques-
tion whether a case or controversy existed in Powell, or whether it was in fact simply
a test case. As Mr. Justice Marshall stated, "the record in this case [was] utterly in-
adequate to permit the sort of informed and responsible adjudication which alone can
support the announcement of an important and wide-ranging new constitutional princi-
ple." Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 521 (1968).
63. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
64. Id. at 240.
65. Justices Douglas, Stewart, White, Brennan and Marshall.
66. Comment, supra note 30, at 805.
67. See notes 53-55 supra and accompanying text.
68. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 271 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Primarily, a punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of
human beings. States must not arbitrarily inflict severe punishment. A severe punish-
ment must not be unacceptable to contemporary society (Justice Brennan suggested
that the inquiry under this principle is whether any of several objective indicators are
present, for example, the existence of the punishment in other jurisdictions, and the
historic usage of the punishment). Finally, a severe punishment must not be excessive,
which was defined as unnecessary punishment, because there was a significantly less
1980]
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adjudicated eighth amendment challenges by considering the nature
of the crime, the purpose of the law, and the length of the sentence
imposed. 9 In Furman, the Court held that the eighth and fourteenth
amendments proscribed the death penalty imposed pursuant to
statutes which leave juries and judges with "untrammelled discre-
tion" in imposing the death penalty thereby creating a substantial
risk that death would be inflicted arbitrarily and capriciously.0
Although the opinion in Furman left the death penalty in constitu-
tional limbo, the focus on procedure coupled with the Brennan-
Marshall substantive approach reinstated the objective factors as
the appropriate benchmarks for future CUP clause analysis.
In the wake of Furman a number of states revised or re-
enacted their capital punishment statutes. This flurry of legislative
activity set the stage for the Court's renewed debate about the
death penalty. In Gregg v. Georgia7 and its companion cases, the
Court clarified the conditions under which the death penalty may be
imposed. In all five cases Justices Brennan and Marshall maintained
that the death penalty was unconstitutional per se and reiterated
the gist of their substantive approaches to the CUP clause enun-
ciated in Furman. The plurality consisting of Justices Stewart,
Powell and Stevens in all five cases focused primarily on the pro-
cedural aspects and concluded that capital statutes must require the
sentencing authority to consider both mitigating and aggravating
factors about both the offense and the defendant, and to provide
some direction in these considerations. The Court did not specify the
factors to be considered or the form of guidance required."2 The
plurality in Gregg held that death is not invariably unconstitutional"
and that sentences must not be excessive in either unnecessarily or
wantonly inflicting pain, or being grossly disproportionate to the
severity of the crime, to be determined by "objective indicia that
severe punishment adequate to achieve the purposes for which the punishment is in-
flicted. Justice Brennan indicated that since the principles are interrelated, the test
should be applied cumulatively. For a thorough assessment of the opinions of Justices
Brennan and Marshall in Furman, see Wheeler, supra note 26.
69. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 322-28 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 238-374 (Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, JJ., concurr-
ing).
71. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The Court upheld statutes that guided the discretion
of the sentencing authority in Gregg, Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); and Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); it struck down mandatory death statutes in Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
72. The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 56, 64 (1976).
73. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976).
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reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction."7 Although the
Court in Gregg and its companion cases applied these principles to
the narrow issue of imposing death for deliberate murder, the
analysis seems applicable to other eighth amendment challenges in
which the inquiry is whether the sentence is grossly dispropor-
tionate to the offenses committed.
In another case involving the death penalty for rape, the Court
further refined the objective test and explicitly utilized the concept
of proportionality. In Coker v. Georgia,"5 the prisoner escaped from
a Georgia prison (he was serving time for various violent crimes in-
cluding murder and rape), and in the course of committing armed
robbery, he raped an adult female. He was convicted and sentenced
to death on the rape charge because the jury found aggravating cir-
cumstances, namely, that the rape was committed by a person with
prior felony convictions and committed in the course of committing
another capital felony, armed robbery."6 The Court held that death is
a grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime
of rape and is therefore banned by the eighth amendment,77 even
though death may measurably achieve the objectives of punishment
and is not invalid for its failure to do so.T The Court utilized the
test it employed in Gregg and its companion cases which had ap-
proved the holdings and dicta from earlier cases. The current test
for proportionality is:
the eighth amendment bars not only those punishments
that are "barbaric" but also those that are "excessive" in
relation to the crime committed.... [A] punishment is "ex-
cessive" and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable
contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence
is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposi-
tion of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of propor-
74. Id. at 173. The Court added "[ijt is clear ... that the Eighth Amendment
has not been regarded as a static concept," citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). In
Trop, the Court invoked the CUP clause to hold that expatriation for wartime deser-
tion was cruel and unusual. I&. at 103. Although Trop involved the method of punish-
ment (not disproportionality) the Court established that "[t]he basic concept underlying
the eighth amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man." Id at 100. It also pro-
vided that the standard to be applied in eighth amendment questions should be based
on "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
Id. at 101.
75. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
76. Id. at 587-91.
77. Id. at 592.
78. Id. at 592, n.4.
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tion to the severity of the crime. Furthermore, these
Eighth Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to
be, merely the subjective views of individual Justices;
judgment should be informed by objective factors to the
maximum possible extent.... [A]ttention must be given to
the public attitudes concerning a particular sentence-
history and precedent, legislative attitudes, and the
response of juries reflected in their sentencing decisions
are to be consulted.7 9
In applying these considerations to the situation in Coker, the
Court found that Georgia was the only state that authorized death
for the rape of an adult female 0 and that in the vast majority of
Georgia cases juries have not imposed the death sentence."1 The
Court conceded that while rape deserves severe punishment, the
death penalty is inappropriately excessive for the rapist because
such a unique and irrevocable sentence is unsuitable for the rapist
who, as opposed to the murderer, does not take human life." Nor did
Coker's prior convictions or the fact that the rape occurred during
the perpetration of another capital crime, both aggravating cir-
cumstances under Georgia law, affect the Court's decision. 3 Finally,
the Court refused to uphold the death sentence for rape in light of
the fact that not even a deliberate killer (in the absence of ag-
gravating circumstances) would receive the death penalty. Coker
represented the first modern application of the proportionality con-
cept of the CUP clause, and, in addition, the Court stated a
definitive test for future claims of disproportionality.
The Court recently reaffirmed the rule that the death penalty
must not be imposed under sentencing procedures that create a
substantial risk of punishment in an arbitrary, capricious manner. In
Godfrey v. Georgia85 the Court held that, if a state wished to
authorize capital punishment, the state has a constitutional respon-
sibility to tailor and apply its law to avoid arbitrary application of
the death penalty. This responsibility includes defining capital
crimes in a manner that obviates standardless sentencing discretion.
In addition, the responsibility of the state involves channeling the
79. Id. at 592.
80. Id at 596.
81. Id at 596-97.
82. Id at 598.
83. Id at 599.
84. Id. at 600.
85. - U.S. -, 100 S. Ct. 1759 (1980).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 1 [1980], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol15/iss1/6
RUMMEL v. ESTELLE
discretion of the sentencing authority by clear and objective stand-
ards that provide specific, detailed guidance and allow for rational
review of the sentencing process." The Georgia Supreme Court af-
firmed the death penalty, because the offense met the statutory re-
quirement in that the crime was "outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible and inhumane."87 The Supreme Court found this interpreta-
tion of the state statute overbroad and vague, because these
statutory words, standing alone, did not inherently restrain ar-
bitrary imposition of capital punishment.8 The Court determined
that a trial judge is obligated to dispel any juror's preconceptions
about murder through his jury instructions. Since the Court found
no such instructions in Godfrey, the Court held that Georgia had im-
posed the death penalty without any standards designed to guide
the discretion of the jury." The Court could not distinguish this
case, in which the death sentence was imposed, from the many cases
in which the death sentence was not imposed. Therefore, the Court
held that the imposition of capital punishment in Godfrey violated
the constitutional protections of the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments."
The current status of the proportionality concept of the eighth
amendment is that a state may impose the death sentence, subject
to certain limitations, for deliberate murder, but may not impose it
for anything less, like rape." In certain respects this status raises
more questions than answers, especially with regard to the ability of
a state to impose the penultimate sanction-life imprisonment- for
crimes less serious than, for example, murder, rape and armed rob-
bery. Another unanswered question is whether the proportionality
concept, as applied in the context of recidivist statutes, is to be
applied to the criminal's "status" as a habitual offender, or to the
crimes he has committed. Rummel v. Estelle9 provided the testing
ground for the Court but no new progress was made. Indeed, the
86. Id at 1764.
87. Id at 1765.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id
91. In his concurring opinion in Godfrey, Mr. Justice Marshall claimed that
appellate courts have been incapable of guaranteeing the kind of objectivity and
evenhandedness that the Court contemplated in Gregg. Justice Marshall concluded
that the criminal justice system, in its present form, simply is incapable of objectively
differentiating those persons who should be sentenced to die from those who should
not. Godfrey v. Georgia, __ U.S. -, 100 S. Ct. 1759, 1769-72 (1980). See generally
Dix, Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose Death, 68 GEo. L. J. 97 (1979).
92. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
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decision in Rummel merely reiterated the appropriate tests to be
applied and inquiries to be made in assessing the constitutionality of
capital punishment. The decision failed to relieve any of the tension
existing between the excessiveness principle and the modern axiom
of penology-that the punishment should fit the offender and not
merely the crime. 3
RUMMEL V. ESTELLE
The preceding analysis demonstrates several concepts about
past Supreme Court interpretation of the CUP clause. The history
of this interpretation by the Court is one of judicial restraint based
on notions of federalism and comity. The CUP clause encompasses
methods of punishment as well as punishments that are grossly
disproportionate to the nature and number of offenses committed."
With regard to disproportionality, "[tihe inquiry focuses on whether
a person deserves such punishment, not simply whether punishment
would serve a utilitarian goal."95 The disproportionality concept of
the CUP clause applies to both capital and noncapital cases. Further-
more, the Court has attempted to minimize the subjective views of
the individual justices by relying on certain objective factors in-
cluding the nature of the crime, the sentence imposed for the same
crime in other states, and the sentence imposed for other crimes in
the same state." The CUP clause cases demonstrate also that there
exists a fine line between the disproportionality concept and other
distinct concepts such as identity of offense 7 and the power of a
state to define crime." Rummel differed from earlier CUP clause
cases in that the issue in Rummel was clearly one of dispropor-
tionality.
At the outset of its opinion the Court clarified that dispropor-
tionality was the sole question in RummeL The Court indicated that
the defendant conceded two issues. First, he recognized the constitu-
tionality of the Texas recidivist statute" and objected merely to the
93. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949). See generally Note, supra
note 31, 79 HARV. L. REV. at 645.
94. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 271.
95. Id. at 288 (Powell, J., dissenting). See note 93 supra and accompanying
text. See also Note, Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 1119 (1979).
96. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); accord, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). See notes 42, 71-85 supra and
accompanying text.
97. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
98. See notes 47-52 supra and accompanying text.
99. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967) (Texas recividist statute is not un-
constitutional).
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statute as applied to the facts of his case."' Second, Rummel did not
challenge the authority of Texas to characterize his offenses as
felonies. °1' Rather, the issue before the Court was whether it was
constitutional for Texas to impose a mandatory life sentence as
opposed to a term of years for the defendant's third non-capital
felony.' In deciding this controversial issue, the Court determined
that neither the capital punishment cases nor Weems were ap-
plicable to RummeL
Rejection of Weems
Eighth amendment interpretation has been infrequent and has
occurred predominantly within the context of capital punishment." 3
The defendant relied in part on the death penalty cases to argue
that his penalty was disproportionate to his offenses.'0 The theme
that the death penalty is unique in its irrevocability has been
repeated often. The Court recognized that, as a result of the unique
nature of the death penalty, the capital cases are of limited
assistance in adjudicating a challenge that one's imprisonment is ex-
cessively cruel and unusual.1"' By so restricting itself, the Court
turned its back on the methods it employed in earlier eighth amend-
ment interpretation and, in essence, begged the real question at
issue in RummeL The defendant's challenge derived from the basic
premise that mandatory life imprisonment is also unique in its per-
manent denial of fundamental rights and freedoms and therefore
should not be meted out to just any three-time felon, but only to
those most threatening to society and therefore most deserving. 6 In
other words, he asked the Court to apply the same procedural
safeguards to the penultimate sanction as the Court has required in
100. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 268.
101. The problem in Rummel was not one of the state improperly defining a
crime. Compare Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). See notes 47-52 supra and
accompanying text.
102. Id. at 271. Texas argued also that the defendant had waived his right to
object to his punishment since he failed to object during the sentencing phase of the
trial. The en banc court dismissed this argument, Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651,
653-54 (5th Cir. 1978), and the Court summarily agreed in deferrence to the circuit
court interpretation of state law. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 267 n.7. Although the
Court failed to make the distinction, it cannot be overemphasized that Rummel was
not a case involving identity of the offense. See note 33 supra.
103. See notes 63-93 supra and accompanying text.
104. E.g. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
105. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 272.
106. Id. at 268-72; Brief for Petitioner at 25-30.
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capital cases after Furman.'7 While Rummel did not claim that his
sentence under the Texas recidivist statute was arbitrarily imposed,
he did claim that the mandatory, nondiscretionary procedure unfair-
ly grouped him with violent, threatening felons. This categorization,
albeit not as grossly apparent as in the death cases, nonetheless
singles out the recidivist in the same way as does capital punish-
ment. '°8 By ignoring the death penalty cases, the Court implied that
the principle of disproportionality may apply less to noncapital cases
than to capital cases. ' 9
In addition to claiming that the death penalty cases were not
applicable, the Court brushed off Weems as being inapplicable to
Rummel The defendant claimed that the Court in Weems objected
not only to the exotic accessories of cadena temporal but held that
the length of the sentence alone was unconstitutionally excessive.
Rummel argued that frequent recent citations to Weems attested to
its continued vitality."0 However, the Court concluded that the
Court in Weems considered cadena temporal in its entirety as ex-
cessive.' The Court held that Weems could not "be applied without
regard to its peculiar facts: the triviality of the charged offense, the
impressive length of the minimum term of imprisonment, and the
extraordinary nature of the 'accessories' included within the punish-
ment of cadena temporaL'" 2 The dissent pointed out, however, that
Weems has been cited generally for the proposition that
punishments grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime
are unconstitutionally cruel and unusual.1 3 While it may be true that
the Court will never find a sentence unconstitutional for its ex-
cessive length alone, the facts in Rummel are as equally peculiar as
those in Weems. Even though he committed three felonies, the
defendant's offenses were not only close to the line drawn between
107. See notes 63-93 supra and accompanying text.
108. This is especially true since Texas imposes mandatory life imprisonment
only upon the capital murderer and the recidivist. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 3 §§
12.31, 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974). Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 300-01 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing); Brief for The Peitioner at 11, 44-46.
109. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 288 (Powell, J., dissenting).
110. Brief for The Petitioner at 8, 20-23.
111. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 274.
112. Id (emphasis in original).
113. Id. at 290 (Powell, J., dissenting). See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685
(1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
592 (1977) (opinion of White, J.); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 325 (1972) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring).
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felony theft and petty theft," ' they were in fact "trivial" when com-
pared to such crimes as murder, rape, armed robbery, or, as the ma-
jority suggests, antitrust and bribery. The minimal length of the im-
prisonment term, life, is certainly impressive notwithstanding
possibilities of parole and good-time credit. Finally, parole restric-
tions, while not as aggressive or extraordinary as the accessories of
cadena temporal, are nearly as restricting in practical terms.15
Weems then would appear to be controlling because the factual
situation therein is analagous to the situation in Rummel in terms of
triviality of offenses, impressive length of imprisonment, and the
accessories. The Court accepted the notion of proportionality in
Weems, but then determined that Weems did not apply to Rummel,
because the finding of disproportionality in Weems could not be
divorced from the extreme nature of the facts of that case.1 ' Thus,
the Court in Rummel acknowledged the existence of the principle of
disproportionality espoused in the death penalty cases and Weems.
The Court, however, determined that neither the death cases nor
Weems were of any assistance in deciding the constitutionality of
the sentence imposed on the defendant. As the dissent correctly
pointed out, "[s]uch a limitation finds no support in the history of
eighth amendment jurisprudence."'"7
Deference to Legislative Prerogative
While the Rummel decision was inconsistent with earlier CUP
clause cases, because the Court rejected both Weems and the death
114. This is demonstrated by the fact that his third felony, theft by false
pretext, would not qualify as a felony under current Texas law. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
tit. 3 § 31.03(d)(3) (Vernon 1974) as amended (1979 Supp.). See Rummel v. Estelle, 445
U.S. at 295 (Powell, J., dissenting); Brief for The Petitioner at 11, 46.
115. Although released from prison, a parolee lives under wide-ranging restric-
tions, any violation of which may result in revocation of parole and return to prison.
See Supplement to Brief for the Respondent at S.3-3b (Rules, Texas Board of Pardons
and Paroles, § 205.03.02.001-.005). As stated by the Court in Morrissey v. Brewer
Typically, parolees are forbidden to use liquor or to have associations or
correspondence with certain categories of undesirable persons. Typically,
also they must seek permission from their parole officers before engaging
in specified activities, such as changing employment or living quarters,
marrying, acquiring or operating a motor vehicle, traveling outside the
community, and incurring substantial indebtedness. Additionally, parolees
must regularly report to the parole officer to whom they are assigned and
sometimes they must make periodic written reports of their activities.
408 U.S. 471, 478 (1972). See also Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651, 669 (5th Cir. 1978)
(en banc) (dissenting opinion). Compare these restrictions to those of cadena temporal
supra note 37 and accompanying text.
116. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 273.
117. Id. at 288 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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penalty cases, the decision was consistent with earlier decisions in
that the Court maintained its traditional policy of judicial restraint.
Historically the Court has been reluctant to strike a punishment im-
posed by a state pursuant to the legislative prerogative of that
state.1 ' The Court in Rummel cited the warning that judgments on
eighth amendment challenges ought to be made free from the sub-
jective views of the individual Justices."9 The Court distinguished
the line-drawing done in the death penalty cases from that re-
quested by the defendant by stating that "this line [between death
and imprisonment] was considerably clearer than would be any con-
stitutional distinction between one term of years and a shorter or
longer term of years."" The Court relied also on the objective
distinction made by the Court in Weems between cadena temporal
and the traditional punishments imposed by the various American
states. 2' The Court concluded that it could undermine state
legislative prerogative only in extreme cases such as when the state
legislature approved the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty
or cadena temporal."
The defendant never claimed that lines should not be drawn at
some point, nor did he dispute the fact that Texas may punish him
severely with a long term of years. In attacking the point at which
the state legislature drew the line, he argued that it was unconstitu-
tional for the state legislature to legislate a mandatory life sentence
to be imposed on a recidivist who has neither threatened society nor
shown a propensity to threaten society. However, neither the
absence of violence nor the small amount of money involved in Rum-
mel influenced the Court.'" The Court rejected the nature-of-the-
offense argument, because the state interest involved in Rummel
was to punish a repeat offender, not to punish a non-violent thief."
The Court relied on two early cases 2 5 to emphasize further the
Court's history of judicial restraint and to lend credence to its deter-
mination that it should retain that posture. Neither case contains
118. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 274; Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
378-79 (1910).
119. Id. at 274-75. See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
120. Id. at 275.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 275-76.
124. Id. at 276.
125. Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916); Graham v. West
Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 631 (1912).
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any discussion of CUP clause and in each case the Court summarily
dismissed the eighth amendment challenge without even a hint of
reasoning. Neither case can support any solid conclusion, except
that in those specific instances the Court found the eighth amend-
ment challenge unpersuasive.'28 While the Court has in fact been
reluctant to intervene in a state legislature's line-drawing process
with respect to the imposition of sentences, the Court in Rummel
relied on several cases "that added little to our knowledge of the
scope of the cruel and unusual language."'" In retaining its policy of
judicial restraint in Rummel, the Court virtually rejected the notion
that the nature of the offense is a critical consideration in determin-
ing whether a punishment is grossly disproportionate to the crime
committed. "It is difficult to imagine felonies that pose less danger
to the peace and good order of a civilized society than the three
crimes committed by the petitioner. '12 The Court also exercised
restraint by declining to adopt the comparative analysis it had
employed in earlier cases.
Rejecting the Comparative Analysis
To minimize the risk of judicial subjectivity, the Court has
relied on certain objective factors in adjudicating eighth amendment
challenges. In addition to considering the nature of the offense, the
Court in Weems adopted a two-pronged comparative analysis which
the Court continues to employ." The test compares the challenged
sentence with the sanction for the same crime in other states; and,
the sanction for other crimes in the same state."s In Rummel, the
Court, while not expressly rejecting interjurisdictional comparative
analysis, determined that to compare the Texas recidivist system to
systems in other jurisdictions would be complex and "inimical to
traditional notions of federalism. 13' The Court also expressly re-
126. With reference to Graham, and equally applicable to Badders, is the dis-
sent's assertion that "[a) one-sentence holding in a preincorporation decision is hardly
relevant to the determination of [Rummel]." Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 290 n.7. In-
deed, one recent commentator did not include Graham on her list of preincorporation
cases which discussed the CUP clause. Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death. Evolving
Standards For The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989,
997 n.28 (1978).
127. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 325 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
128. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 295 (Powell, J., dissenting).
129. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-94 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380 (1910); but see
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958).
130. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380-81 (1910).
131. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 282.
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jected the intrajurisdictional analysis as being too speculative.1 32 In
light of the actual operation of the Texas recidivist scheme, judicial
restraint was the appropriate posture. As a result, however, the
Court has left lower courts without any standards to apply in future
disproportionality cases.
The Court examined the operation of the Texas recidivist
statute prior to outlining the difficulties it perceived in applying the
comparative analysis to RummeL 13 3 The Court questioned why the
defendant failed to reform after having served time on two previous
occasions. The Court correctly pointed out that under Texas law, a
person does not receive "a mandatory life sentence merely because
he is a three-time felon," ' 4 as the dissent argued, but rather a
recidivist must twice demonstrate his or her incorrigibility. "One in
Rummel's position has been both graphically informed of the conse-
quences of lawlessness and given an opportunity to reform, all to no
avail.""1 5 Any analysis of the appropriateness of a punishment re-
quires consideration of the penological objectives of the state and
the viable methods which would achieve them. The dissent posited a
discretionary system, employed by several states,"'6 in which the
sentencing authority may consider all behavioral evidence including
the crimes of the habitual felon to determine whether the maximal
sentence is justified. The Court concluded that the mandatory life
sentence Texas imposes on three-time felons is simply a societal
decision that such criminals deserve serious penalties after shorter
terms of imprisonment have proven ineffectual.1 37 Punishing
recidivism is not only constitutional l" but an important aspect of the
penological objectives of most states. To arrive at a workable
system, the state legislatures must draw lines and inevitably the
criminal at the margin, like Rummel, receives what would appear to
be an unconstitutionally disproportionate sentence. Assuming that
the Texas prison/parole system is effectual, Rummel should have
reformed after twice serving time; Texas may punish him severely
for his failure to reform, based on his recidivist status. In this way,
132. Id. at 282 n.27.
133. Id. at 278. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
134. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 298 n.18 (Powell, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 278.
136. Id. at 298 n.18 (Powell, J., dissenting). See, e.g. IDAHO CODE § 19-2514
137. Id. at 278.
138. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 1 [1980], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol15/iss1/6
RUMMEL v. ESTELLE
the punishment is in fact designed "to fit the offender and not merely
the crime," '39 and thus it appears to be in accord with modern
penological theory.
With regard to the criterion concerning the punishment of
recidivists in other jurisdictions, the defendant cited the national and
worldwide trends toward lighter, discretionary sentences and the re-
quirement in many states that at least one of the crimes of the
recidivist be violent. "' The Court did not dwell long on this point and
indicated that both West Virginia and Washington have similar
statutes and that, even if other appellate courts had been willing to
review the proportionality of sentences under these statutes, the
Court itself must ultimately decide the issue."' The Court determined
that, not only was the legislative judgment in those states the same as
that in Texas, but whatever distinctions existed between the Texas
system and that in other states were "subtle rather than gross.""'
The Court concluded that it could not apply a comparison test in
Rumme4 because comparing the crimes for which various states im-
pose death is different from attempting to evaluate the various
state recidivist schemes within the complex matrix proposed by the
defendant."" The dissent, on the other hand, found no difficulty in ap-
plying the comparison test; it determined that comparing the Texas
system with that in other states was an appropriate method of ascer-
taining the "contemporary values concerning the infliction of a
challenged sanction."'" While these arguments are persuasive, the
Court refused to apply the interjurisdictional comparative test it
had employed previously.
139. See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
140. Brief for The Petitioner at 39-44. The defendant indicated that the other
states employing recidivist statutes require at least one of the following:
(1) commission of more than three felonies; or
(2) at least one felony must have been violent; or
(3) a limit on mandatory sentence to periods substantially less than life; or
(4) grant discretion to the sentencing authority.
See also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 298 (Powell, J., dissenting).
141. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 279.
142. Id.
143. Id The Court hinted also that it might have been swayed had it found
evidence of contemporary legislative or public opinion contrary to its findings. The
Court cited the legislative reaction to Furman in re-enacting the death penalty for
murder. For the Court, the analagous situation was Spencer v. Texas which confirmed
the constitutionality of recidivist statutes, but did not evoke an outpouring of legisla-
tion or public response like Furman. Id. at 280 n.22.
144. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976), cited in Rummel v. Estelle, 445
U.S. at 299 n.19 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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The Court discussed two additional factors that, according to
the Court, further impaired its ability to utilize the comparative
analysis. The Court pointed out that even under a life sentence the
defendant could be eligible for parole in as few as twelve years
under the Texas good-time credit system.' 5  The Court also
acknowledged Rummel's right-privilege distinction'" and agreed that
it could not treat a life sentence as if it were a twelve year term."7
Nonetheless, the Court noted the general, acceptance of parole as a
variation on imprisonment ' and thereby adopted the en banc
majority's realistic approach to conclude that the defendant's life
sentence with the possibility of parole was distinguishable from a
prisoner serving a life sentence without parole as is allowed under
some recidivist statutes to punish violent felons." 9 A key factor for
the Court, then, was the likelihood that Rummel would be paroled
after a term of years as long as that which he would have received
for his third crime alone. Thus, the Court determined that in light of
the Texas parole and GTC policies, any comparison to other state
practices would be too complex."5
The second factor that prevented the Court from using the
comparative analysis was that of prosecutorial discretion. Under the
145. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 280. Theoretically, there exists a distinction
between a finite term of years from which GTC may be deducted and mandatory life
imprisonment from which GTC cannot be deducted due to the indefinite duration of
the life sentence. This academic argument is unfounded because those serving life
sentences in Texas are in fact eligible for parole and GTC. Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d
651, 665 (1978). An inmate serving a life sentence is eligible for parole in twenty years.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, §§ 15(a)(b) (Vernon 1979), GTC shortens the
prison time that an inmate must serve before he is eligible for parole. If an inmate
gets the best possible classification, that is, State Approved Trusty (SAT), for every
thirty days served in good conduct, thirty days are subtracted from the period which
must be served in order to become eligible for parole. Thus, the defendant, as an SAT,
would only have to serve about ten years before becoming eligible for parole. Of
course, an inmate's classification may vary depending on his record both in and out of
prison. Furthermore, GTC is a privilege, not a right. TEX. CIv. CODE ANN. tit. 108, art.
6184 §§ a-1 (Vernon 1970).
It may also be noted that in the past several years, all those serving life
sentence for theft in Texas received parole status after serving between 10-25 years.
See Supplemental Brief for the Respondent at S.9, S.10.
146. Id See also Brief for the Petitioner at 10, 30-38; Rummel v. Estelle, 587
F.2d 651, 668-69 (5th Cir. .1978) (en banc) (dissenting opinion).
147. Id.
148. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972); see also note 115 supra
and accompanying text.
149. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 281.
150. Id. For a critique of the en banc court's analysis along these lines see
Note, Recidivist Laws Under the Eighth Amendment-Rummel v. Estelle, 10 TOL. L.
REv. 606, 627-40 (1979).
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Texas recidivist scheme, the prosecutor has the discretion to pro-
secute the offender for his or her third offense, or proceed under
the recidivist statute for an enhanced sentence. As the Court noted,
this discretionary feature coupled with the threat of an enhanced
sentence in the plea-bargaining stage weeds out the "petty" of-
fenders technically within the recidivist statute.151 According to
Rummel, prosecutorial discretion was not an issue in the case
because it was not argued on the record. Furthermore, he challenged
the legislative right to confer the power to punish a three-time petty
offender under the recidivist statute, not the decision of the pro-
secutor to exercise that power."5 2 The Court determined that it must
uphold the sentence because the state requested a remand to the
sentencing court for the purpose of introducing the entire criminal
record of the defendant in the event his present sentence was un-
constitutional. The Court stated that "one reasonably might wonder
whether that court could then sentence Rummel to life imprison-
ment [if it found additional felonies] even though his recidivist status
based on only three felonies had been held to be a 'cruel and
unusual' punishment."'" Thus, the Court upheld the sentence at
least in part for fear that if it did not, the recidivist statute for any
number of felonies greater than three would have been rendered in-
effectual.
The Court in Rummel not only rejected Weems and the death
penalty cases, it also declined to utilize the tests successfully
employed in other eighth amendment cases under the guise of
federalism and comity. The Court posited the complexities courts
encounter in attempting to make interjurisdictional comparisons as
an excuse for not having applied the comparison tests. The Court in-
dicated that under our present federal system, "some State will
always bear the distinction of treating particular offenders more
severely than any other State.""5 The Court held that since neither
precedent nor penologists gave them any clear direction in their
decision-making process, any change toward lighter, discretionary
sentences is one which must be legislatively not judicially
mandated.'55 The Court found that, since states draw the line be-
151. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 281. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456
(1962) (prosecutorial discretion under the West Virginia recidivist statute upheld as
constitutional).
152. Brief for The Petitioner at 15, 73-74. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S.
357, 361-65 (1978) (prosecutor's discretionary power upheld on basis of need for broad
prosecutorial power).
153. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 281.
154. Id. at 282.
155. Id. at 283-84.
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tween petty and felony theft at markedly different amounts, then
Texas may draw its own line "subject only to those strictures of the
eighth amendment that can be informed by objective factors, ' 1" and
Texas may treat the defendant differently because of his recidivist
status than it could had he been a first time offender. 57 The court
refused to utilize the various objective indicia that it had developed
earlier and conveniently tucked itself under the comfortable blanket
of federalism. The Court failed to posit an alternative framework to
guide state legislatures thereby leaving state lawmakers free to
define the breadth of the eighth amendment proportionality "stric-
ture." By its decision in Rummel, the Court created an uncertainty
as to which tests for disproportionality might be applicable outside
the context of capital punishment.
CONCLUSION
The CUP clause of the eighth amendment proscribes both bar-
barous methods of punishment and those punishments that are
grossly disproportionate to the nature and number of offenses com-
mitted. Traditionally, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to in-
validate sentences imposed pursuant to state statutes. Nonetheless,
there have been instances, especially in the context of capital
punishment, in which the Court has exercised its constitutional duty
to invalidate disproportional punishments. Rummel v. Estelle was a
case in which the defendant received a sentence for life imprison-
ment as mandated by the Texas recidivist statute for three theft
crimes involving about $230. Given that proportionality is an
accepted constitutional minimum, it would appear that the Court in
Rummel abridged its constitutional duty to intervene to prevent un-
constitutional legislative overreaching.
That conclusion, however, is purely academic and fails to con-
sider the practical ramifications of the Texas recidivist scheme.
Under current practice, a recidivist serving a life sentence in Texas
is likely to be paroled after about fifteen or twenty years in prison.
Mandatory life sentences are not inherently disproportionate, and,
indeed, they play a significant deterrent role in a recidivist system
designed to protect society from those offenders most repugnant to
it. The result reached by the Court in Rummel is justifiable in that
the line-drawing process is one traditionally reserved for state
legislatures. The decision in Rummel clearly indicates that the
156. Id. at 284 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
157. Id
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Court willingly accepts the state prerogative to punish a habitual of-
fender for his or her recidivist status alone regardless of the nature
of the criminal conduct of the offender. Furthermore, it can be
reasonably inferred that in future cases the Court will take
cognizance of the practical operation of the particular
penal/recidivist system in question with little regard as to systems
employed under similar circumstances in other jurisdictions. The re-
jection by the Court of the comparative analyses developed in
earlier CUP clause cases leaves other courts and legislatures
without suitable guidance to deal with challenges to the propor-
tionality of terms of imprisonment. Such a state of affairs may well
leave the CUP clause in a constitutional limbo.
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